Lightning Network Griefing Attacks – Bitcoin Magazine

What happens when your Lightning Network routing node is fed with garbage transactions that never resolve? In short, it causes a lot of grief for routing nodes. What was once a smooth, global payment system can be locked up with trivial effort from a savvy script writer.

Working in a small team of routing nodes, we successfully ran a test of the attack with real funds and demonstrated the “griefing” attack described by Joost Jager. The attack is called a grief attack since it is not a theft of funds, but it causes a victim’s Lightning funds to be frozen: a major upset. What we found is that griefing is a serious threat to large “wumbo” channels expecting to earn a yield on their bitcoin, only to have their funds frozen for a period of time.

This is mostly a grief attack: no loss of funds, but the victim may be forced to pay for an expensive channel force close. This is a known vulnerability on mainnet Lightning and it needs to be understood and prioritized, especially at this early market stage of Bitcoin’s Lightning Network.

Thanks to Clark Burkhardt and Phillip Sheppard for their willingness to participate in this test and to Jager for his tireless work to bring attention and priority to this vulnerability. Jager played the role of the attacker for our demonstration, while Burkhardt and Sheppard joined me as connected victim routing nodes.

How The Attack Works

The attacker saturates one (or several) channel(s) with Hashed Time Locked Contracts (HTLCs) that don’t resolve as a finalized payment. These are a special breed of HTLCs known as HODL invoices. Only 483 of these unresolved HTLCs are required to overwhelm a channel per direction. Once those HTLCs are in the channel, any transactions using that same channel direction are impossible, including a transaction to cooperatively close that channel.

In theory, an attacker could contact the victim (perhaps via a keysend message or in an “onion blob”) and…

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